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It has been widely accepted that the user of an information system (IS) is the weakest link in information 
security violations. The insider threat has become a topic of increasing interest for organizations as well as 
in the information security literature. While information security policies to enforce security procedures 
are being implemented, their long term effectiveness is unclear. Organizations do not follow standard 
procedures in controlling for employees’ compliance with security policies and past research has focused 
primarily on the prediction of compliance intention, not actual compliance behavior. We are addressing 
this problem by introducing the theory of self-regulation and the theory of self-determination to identify 
what factors cause some individuals to maintain compliance with security policies and others not, and 
what roles motivation and organizational reward and punishment structures play in the initiation and 
retention of security compliance behavior. We propose a longitudinal experiment to test our hypotheses. 
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Introduction 
As organizations become increasingly reliant on information technology and the amount of data gathered 
and commonly accessed by a number of employees throughout the organization rises, effective 
safeguarding of information is imperative. Not only are technological prevention mechanisms necessary 
to deter malicious attacks on the system, a greater concern in recent years is the threat that comes from 
within the organization (Chen et al. 2012). It has been widely accepted that the user of an information 
system (IS) is the weakest link in information security violations (Crossler et al. 2013; Ifinedo 2014; 
Warkentin and Willison 2009), measured by the number of incidents and by their severity (Chen et al. 
2012).  
To counteract this trend, companies have begun to implement Information Security Policies (ISPs) to 
enforce security procedures (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). However, violations of such policies by the 
organization’s employees are common (Ifinedo 2014; Siponen and Vance 2010) and cause billion-dollar 
monetary losses for the organization (Calluzzo and Cante 2004). Violations can be categorized as 
intentional or unintentional non-compliance (Crossler et al. 2013) with either malicious or non-malicious 
motivation (Aurigemma 2013). For example, an employee passing on a password in the belief that no 
harm will occur would have behaved in a non-malicious intentional non-compliance way, while an 
employee who tries to solicit another employee’s password with the intent to exploit the system would 
behave in a malicious intentional non-compliant way. We know that unintentional non-compliance is 
often caused by a lack of awareness, training, and/or motivation (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010), while 
intentional non-compliance research has focused on investigating the phenomenon from a criminalistics 
perspective, relying on personal and environmental factors in predicting behavioral intention. Questions 
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have been asked in terms of how to deter employees and outsiders from committing malicious attacks, 
how to protect information from attackers on a technical level, what the factors are that influence 
intention to comply and how intention to comply with security policies can be predicted; however, how to 
determine whether intention really translates into actual behavior, what factors influence this 
relationship, and how to maintain compliance with IS security policies over time has not been adequately 
addressed.  
Hence, a number of shortcomings are apparent in previous IS security literature. First, a lack of diversity 
in theory is evident (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). In a survey of 1280 papers in the top 20 journals in 
IS security literature, 1043 did not ground their results in theory (Siponen et al. 2008). Based on the 
maturity cycle for other IS disciplines, with the growth and maturity of a discipline comes an increase in 
theoretically grounded research as well as a focus away from technical/technological issues toward more 
managerial issues (Warkentin and Willison 2009). While a move from technical to more managerial 
issues has become apparent in information systems security literature over recent years (Aurigemma 
2013), a lack of theory continues to be an issue. The continual use of the same theories is especially 
prevalent in studies highlighting behavioral compliance with security policies. Numerous papers have 
been published using variations of the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Al-Omari et al. 2012; Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Pahnila et al. 2007) as 
well as a multitude of studies using theories from criminology research such as General Deterrence 
Theory (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Herath and H Raghav Rao 2009; Herath and H. Raghav Rao 2009; Pahnila et 
al. 2007) and Protection Motivation Theory (Herath and H Raghav Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and 
Warkentin 2010; Pahnila et al. 2007; Workman et al. 2008a) all without satisfactory focus on 
investigating and explaining the link between behavioral intention and actual behavior. 
Second, as companies are spending large amounts of resources on continual ISP training and 
development, the actual long-term effectiveness of such meetings and training is not clear (Doherty and 
Fulford 2005; Theoharidou et al. 2005). Most empirical research that has validated a number of factors 
and procedures to predict compliance intention has not investigated long-term effects. Therefore, more 
research is necessary to determine those effects.   
Third, past IS research on security compliance has been dominated by either conceptual studies (Dhillon 
and Backhouse 2001; Posthumus and von Solms 2004; Vroom and von Solms 2004) or studies using self-
reported questionnaire data (e.g., Pahnila et al. 2007) which do not allow for the discovery/confirmation 
of causal links between the many constructs that have been used before. Experimental and observational 
evidence is needed to uncover such links. For this reason, we are proposing to conduct a longitudinal 
experiment to potentially expose some of the causal links that have yet to be examined within the domain 
of security compliance behavior. 
Lastly, what the comprehensive research body on security compliance behavior does have in common is 
its focus on compliance intention versus actual compliance behavior. Given the copious amount of studies 
on compliance intention with security policies, this study’s focus is on attempting to close the knowing-
doing gap (i.e., translating intention into actual behavior). While a number of recommendations have 
been made to address this phenomenon, solutions have been varied and results inconclusive, leading to 
the assumption that the mechanisms underlying the gap between intention and behavior have yet to be 
fully understood (Aurigemma 2013; Workman et al. 2008b). While it is generally accepted to use 
behavioral intention as a sufficient predictor for actual behavioral outcomes (Lee et al. 2005), the 
question is justified as to whether, especially in the critical context of information security, behavioral 
intention (which is more often than not self-reported) sufficiently mirrors the reality of the non-compliant 
behavior (Gibson and Frakes 1997). As the consequences of non-compliance are severe, we believe that a 
more in-depth investigation of this phenomenon is needed.   
The goal of this study is to address all of those shortcomings by investigating IS security compliance 
behavior in a longitudinal experiment, while focusing our analysis on the processes that translate 
behavioral intention into actual behavior. To accomplish this, we are introducing the theory of self-
regulation, particularly those mechanisms that govern self-regulation and regulatory mode as they predict 
not only behavior in one point in time but also its maintenance, and self-determination theory (Gagne and 
Deci 2005) focusing on an individual’s type of motivation and its value internalization. We attempt to 
answer the following questions: 
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1) What are the factors that cause some individuals to maintain compliance with security policies 
and others not, after behavioral intention has been established? 
2) What role does motivation play in the retention of security compliance behavior and what are the 
ways in which it can be influenced?  
3) How can organizations influence employee motivation using different reward structures?  
4) How effectively could a self-regulating mechanism influence employee motivation to comply? 
Through a longitudinal experiment, we are attempting to explain and establish causal evidence for the 
factors that influence actual security policy compliance behavior and determine what factors influence the 
continuation of such behavior. 
 
Literature Review  
Until now, the compliance literature has been dominated by studies using either no theory or theories that 
have been extensively used before, such as the Technology Acceptance Model (Al-Omari et al. 2012) as 
well as its predecessors (TRA, TPB) (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Pahnila et 
al. 2007). A composite framework for behavioral compliance with information security policies has been 
proposed (Aurigemma 2013), combining research conducted using theories grounded in the theory of 
planned behavior with research grounded in the fear-appeals model (Johnston and Warkentin 2010).  
A specific set of theories has been used to explain malicious compliance violations. The theories were 
predominantly borrowed from the field of criminology and more recently also from the field of behavioral 
psychology. Sanctions and deterrents have been applied in past research to reduce intentional computer 
abuse, and their importance has been highlighted (e.g., Harrington 1996; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Straub 
1990; Straub and Nance 1990; Straub and Welke 1998). General deterrence theory relies on the strategy-
punishment principle stating that behaviors that are not wanted can be prevented (Chen et al. 2012). 
Punitive approaches, however, are not generally preferred in handling security compliance behavior, as it 
comes with a number of negative influences (Hu et al. 2011; Sims 2014). While early studies using 
deterrence theory found a positive effect of security deterrents and punishment of violations on security 
policy compliance (Straub and Nance, 1990, Straub 1990, Krankanhalli et al. 2003), conclusive results 
could not be found. Some studies were not able to establish a direct link between all sanctions and 
intentions where especially the use of codes of ethics did not show convincing results (Harrington 1996). 
Recent research has found that non-compliant behavior is not always reduced by the introduction of 
sanctions, as individuals often utilize neutralization strategies which allow the employee to perceive only 
minimal harm from their policy violations (Siponen and Vance 2010). 
In contrast, the use of rewards has been found effective, however, again with varying results across a 
number of studies (Andreoni et al. 2003; Fehr and Schmidt 2007; Pahnila et al. 2007). Moreover, Chen et 
al. (2012) have determined an interaction effect between positive rewards for compliance and punishment 
conditions where the distribution of rewards offset effects on compliance intention, especially for those 
punishment conditions that were severe.  
Boss et al. (2009) investigated IS security compliance in terms of its perception of the mandatoriness of 
the controls that are in place, arguing that employees who were aware of the policies were more likely to 
comply, thus, investigating the problem through the lens of theories of organizational control. 
Past IS literature recognizes that motivational aspects play a role in behavioral security compliance 
processes; it is, however, thought of as an antecedent to behavioral intention, as opposed to actual 
behavior (Herath and Rao 2009).  
Reviewing the literature, it becomes apparent that a clear consensus on the effect of rewards, punishment 
and motivation has not been established and control mechanisms are not uniformly considered to be 
effective. While control and deterrence theories address a superficial aspect of the problem, they are not 
tackling the core issue. Punitive approaches address the problem from an extrinsic perspective, while 
research has shown that extrinsically motivated behavior does not always result in the desired actions 
(e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2000; Pierro et al. 2006; Rest 1994). Instead of using a control/force approach, our 
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study focuses on the intrinsic ways employees can be motivated to exercise compliance behavior and 




The theory of self-regulation has frequently been used in educational and learning literature (e.g. Lee et 
al. 2010; Zimmerman 1990) as well as research on exercise psychology (Kolovelonis et al. 2012; Mannetti 
et al. 2012) and has been defined as “the ability to comply with a request, to initiate and cease activities 
according to situational demands, to modulate the intensity, frequency, and duration of verbal and motor 
acts in social and educational settings, to postpone acting upon a desired object or goal, and to generate 
socially approved behavior in the absence of external monitors” (Kolovelonis et al. 2012; Kopp 1982; 
Kruglanski et al. 2000). Self-regulatory systems arbitrate external influences and also comprise the 
foundation of all purposeful action (Bandura 1991). Self-regulation implicates a selection and comparison 
between different goals, as well as means to achieve those goals while simultaneously instigating retained 
movement from one state to another as long as needed to achieve the desired goal (Kruglanski et al. 
2000). Essentially, self-regulation is the process that is undergone to achieve goals, tasks or other 
behavior without the influence of outside forces. For research in information security compliance 
behavior, we define the goal to be achieved as the actual compliance behavior which is to be attained 
without the influence of continuous maintenance efforts such as training, monitoring, etc. To achieve set 
goals, an individual must put in place the appropriate strategies to facilitate the desired behavior 
(Kolovelonis et al. 2012).  
Generally, individuals who practice self-regulation act upon the belief that their actions are ultimately 
intrinsically beneficial for themselves and something they do for themselves, to protect themselves (Deci 
1975, Deci and Ryan 1985, Zimmerman 1998). This intrinsically motivated aspect of compliance would 
then more likely lead to goal achievement (Legault and Inzlicht 2013). To translate this to the information 
security context, self-regulated individuals believe that their compliant behavior is not simply practiced 
for the sake of the organization, but rather for the sake of themselves. If the employee internalizes that 
major monetary losses are directly linked to potential concerns of job security, benefits, raises, etc., the 
motivation which ultimately stems from external sources becomes intrinsic to the individual.  
Two essential components of self-regulation theory are assessment and locomotion (Higgins 2000; 
Scholer and Tory Higgins 2011). According to Kruglanski et al. (2000) locomotion constitutes the aspect 
of self-regulation concerned with movement from state to state and with committing the psychological 
resources that will initiate and maintain goal-related movement in a straightforward and direct manner, 
without undue distractions or delays. Locomoters are characterized by a need to get things done and keep 
it moving, focusing on the execution of tasks more so than their deliberation (Pierro et al. 2006). 
Assessment, on the other hand, “constitutes the comparative aspect of self-regulation concerned with 
critically evaluating entities or states, such as goals or means in relation to alternatives in order to judge 
relative quality’’ (Kruglanski et al. 2000). People high on the assessment scale often fail to execute the 
behavior they set themselves out to do, more often focusing on the deliberation of options and their 
comparison without ultimately executing those.  
In the context of behavioral compliance with information security policies, we define locomotion as the 
maintenance of compliance with information security policies and assessment with the deliberation and 
comparison of whether a security measure is necessary and if so, which one is to be applied. Thus, for 
effective security policy compliance, high loadings on both constructs are necessary.  
Assessment and locomotion work together in such a way that assessment provides evaluative restrictions 




In order to understand the principles of self-regulation, we must take into consideration the type of 
motivation an individual experiences at a given time for a specific task (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) while 
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simultaneously distinguishing between autonomous and controlled motivation. Autonomous motivation 
implies that an individual exercises desire and free will for his/her actions whereas controlled motivation, 
which is solely brought on by external rewards, does not (Gagne and Deci 2005; Legault and Inzlicht 
2013). In general, people who are involved in activities that they find interesting do those activities out of 
free will and hence are autonomously and thus intrinsically motivated. Studies have found that employees 
who are not motivated tend not to follow IS policies (Boss et al. 2009).  Controlled motivation exerts a 
feeling of pressure onto the individual, which is not conducive to goal-achievement (Gagne and Deci 
2005).  
When implementing rewards to motivate specific behavior, extrinsic rewards have been shown to 
potentially have detrimental effects on individuals whose motivations are already mostly intrinsic (e.g. 
Kruglanski et al. 1971; Lepper et al. 1973). A meta–study of 128 experiments examining the effects of 
positive feedback and tangible rewards on intrinsic motivation has confirmed and built on the above 
findings: intrinsic motivation is enhanced by positive feedback while it is undermined by tangible rewards 
(Deci et al. 1999). Thus, investigating the motivational foundations that undermine employee behavior in 
the context of security policy compliance is important.  
It is important to note that in self-determination theory, intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation is not 
distinguished in a black and white manner. Instead, the degree to which an individual is either 
intrinsically or extrinsically motivated lies on a continuum (Gagne and Deci 2005). An important question 
in the literature has been whether all extrinsic rewards automatically and exclusively lead to extrinsic 
motivation or whether there are ways to control such rewards and induce an intrinsic motivation in the 
individual. Especially for those tasks that do not explicitly seem to carry intrinsic value for the individual 
and tasks that are often considered not interesting, the investigation of this phenomenon is valuable. 
Security policy training could fall into this category. Self-determination theory proposes that through 
internalization, it is possible to transform external motivations into internal ones which then exert the 
necessary drive onto the individual to exercise the appropriate behavior without the need for external 
control mechanisms. This phenomenon is conducive to self-regulatory behavior which is necessary for the 
execution of an individual’s actual compliance behavior. Internalization is defined as people taking in 
values, attitudes, or regulatory structures, such that the external regulation of a behavior is transformed 
into an internal regulation and thus no longer requires the presence of an external contingency. Hence, 
self-determination theory suggests that locomotion can be achieved even though rewards are extrinsic, as 
long as its value is being internalized.  Controlled motivation, however, which is solely brought upon by 
external rewards or punishments, does not lead to locomotion and thus continuous actual behavior. 
 
Theoretical Model and Hypotheses  
Based on the above theoretical assumptions, we propose the following conceptual framework (Figure 1). 
For individuals who possess the behavioral intention to comply with information security policies, 
mechanisms of self-determination and self-regulation moderate the relationship between intention and 
actual behavior.  
    
   Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
In line with previous research, we propose that an individual’s behavioral intention to comply is overall 
positively related to motivation, where the type of motivation that an individual possesses is influenced by 
the reward structure that an organization has in place (Figure 2).  
Hypothesis 1: An individual’s behavioral intent to comply with security policies is positively related to 
the motivation toward actual compliance with IS policies.  
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Generally, once an individual has made a conscious choice to comply with security policies, this decision 
is influenced by the organization’s reward structure and general culture toward compliance. External 
rewards such as monetary benefits will generally lead to extrinsic motivation, while policy and awareness 
training that targets internal/intrinsically valuable aspects to the employee will result in motivation that 
will load higher on the intrinsic motivation continuum. Therefore, we propose a moderating relationship 
of the organizational reward structure between behavioral intention to comply with security policies and 
employee motivation to comply. 
Hypothesis 1a: External reward structures are positively related to extrinsic motivation. 
Hypothesis 1b: Intrinsically motivated/internalized reward structures are positively related to intrinsic 
motivation. 
However, rewards are not the only way organizations encourage employee compliance; as a multitude of 
previous research has established, sanctions and punitive measures influence motivation as well. The use 
of sanctions and punitive measures to motivation is inversely related to the relationship to organizational 
rewards and motivation. As an individual has made the conscious choice to comply, the enactment of 
punitive measures and sanctions may induce in them a feeling of pressure and not being trusted with their 
intent, which may then have a negative effect on motivation and overall compliance behavior (Gagne and 
Deci 2005).  
Hypothesis 1c: Sanctions and punitive measures have a negative influence on overall motivation. 
Self-regulation theory proposes that individuals who are intrinsically motivated to conduct a behavior will 
load higher on the locomotion scale as opposed to assessors who are generally more responsive to 
extrinsic motivations. 
Hypothesis 2a: Intrinsic motivation of an individual is positively related to Locomotion, or the execution 
and maintenance of the behavior. 
Hypothesis 2b: Extrinsic motivation of an individual is positively related to Assessment, or the critical 
evaluation of the behavior. 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Model 
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As the constructs of locomotion and assessment are independent and orthogonal to each other 
(Kruglanski et al. 2000), it is possible for an individual to load high on both constructs. While according 
to previous literature, it is said that depending on circumstances, one of the elements will be more 
emphasized than others (Pierro et al. 2006), as in the case of exercise and learning, where locomotion 
alone is considered a sufficient predictor for actual behavior.  In the context of security compliance, we 
propose that locomotion alone is not effective for actual security policy compliance. Locomotion alone 
does not guarantee appropriate compliance actions as it potentially encourages accidental mistakes 
and/or hasty security-related decision making. Therefore, we propose that locomotion, as well as 
assessment alone, are negatively related to actual IS compliance. Assessment alone has the opposite effect 
where the employee becomes indecisive and possibly reluctant to exercise any action at all.  
Hypothesis 3a: Locomotion alone is negatively related to actual IS compliance. 
Hypothesis 3b: Assessment alone is negatively related to actual IS compliance. 
For the retention and maintenance of compliance behavior, we are suggesting a continuous circular 
movement among assessment, locomotion and actual behavior (Figure 3). Employees must continuously 
assess and reassess before exercising any physical behavior. A critical evaluation of each potential security 
violation incident is necessary to avoid accidental compliance violations when the employee is just “in the 
flow” of doing things. For this reason, locomotion and assessment alone are not necessarily sufficient for 
optimal compliance behavior and especially the retention and maintenance of this behavior. Different 
from findings in exercise literature, where it is generally sufficient to follow a pre-assessed workout plan 
where stronger influences of locomotion characteristics are required to keep the program going and 
continuous reassessment is not always necessary, in the context of security compliance both 
characteristics need to be present.  
Hypothesis 4: Strong locomotion and assessment simultaneously lead to greatest influence toward 
actual security compliance. 
 
 
 Figure 3: Self-regulated Compliance Mechanism 
 
Methodology 
A longitudinal experiment will be conducted to test the proposed model. After behavioral intention is 
established among the participating subjects, their locomotion and assessment characteristics will be 
determined prior to the treatments using measurement scales constructed by Kruglanski et al. (2000) 
with items such as “I don’t mind doing things even if they involve extra effort, “or “When I decide to do 
something, I can’t wait to get started,” composing the locomotion scores, and items such as “I am a critical 
person,” or “I like evaluating other people’s plans,” to determine assessment loads.  
To determine intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, we will be using Amabile et al. (1994) Work Preference 
Inventory. Two versions of this scale are available targeted at either the college student or the working 
adult. For the purposes of our experiment, we will be using the student version for purposes of a pilot 
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study and will later extend and compare our study in the context of the working adult. To assess intrinsic 
motivation, items such as “Curiosity is the driving force of what I do” and for extrinsic motivation “I am 
strongly motivated by the grades/money I can earn” will be applied.  
Experimental Design 
To test our proposed model, we will be conducting a 3x2 factorial between-subject analysis. The 
treatments that are received by the subjects will consist of a reward, punishment, and no-reward scenario-
experiment that is written within the context of security behavior compliance. For this initial test of our 
model, a convenience sample of students will be the subjects.  
Procedure 
Prior to the treatments, the subjects will undergo a generic training session (based on general ISO 
guidelines) on information security policy compliance. The subjects will be divided into three groups, each 
undergoing the initial training session. Group 1 will then be subjected to the experimental treatments 
without receiving further training/meetings on policy compliance while receiving rewards, while Group 2 
will receive two additional training sessions during the course of the experiment to induce intrinsically 
motivated behavior and Group 3 will receive no additional training and no rewards. 
The experiment will last over the course of a semester and the students’ participation will be rewarded 
with course credit. The experimental sessions will take place once every two weeks for a duration of 30 
minutes. The groups receiving the rewards, which will be a $5 Starbucks gift card, will be paid every other 
session (once  a month). 
During the course of the experiment, all subjects will be presented with various common security-related 
scenarios in which they have to choose a course of action. To complete those scenarios, the students will 
be placed under time constraints to emulate time pressure from deadlines in real work environments.  
Without prior knowledge of the subjects, after the completion of half of the semester, the three treatments 
will be switched randomly where no student can receive the same treatment as before, and motivation 
types as well as locomotion and assessment loads reassessed at the time of the switch as well as in the end 
of the experiment. A change in motivation type/regulatory mode will indicate whether or not the type of 
reward had an effect on an individual’s motivation as well as regulatory mode. Results of the pilot test will 
be analyzed and revised as needed, to be used as a basis for further study with working adults. 
Contribution 
Theoretically, we are attempting to expand the behavioral IS security compliance stream of research by 
focusing on aspects that have not received much attention previously. The issue of retaining security 
compliance behavior of employees has not been investigated to this date, and we are seeking to spur 
future research in this area by attempting to explain the compliance behavior process in an organization 
with the theories of self-determination and self-regulation.  
We believe that a self-regulated compliance mechanism could potentially reduce or eliminate the need of 
recurrent and costly security policy training sessions and meetings and thus provide the organization with 
cost savings in two ways:  
1. By eliminating the hours and cost for said training 
2. By increasing the effectiveness of initial training, including the appropriate reward structure and 
thus employee motivation  
Our study can guide organization managers in assessing and refining their rewards structures to prompt 
both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in employees. This self-regulated compliance mechanism is 
focusing on security issues here but could be beneficial for a wide range of compliance issues in an 
organization. 
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